Some thoughts on the CUD and other opposition parties  

Antony Shaw, Addis Ababa, 12.1.2005

One of the more surprising elements in debates on recent events in Addis Ababa has been the almost total acceptance of the CUD's own evaluations and pronouncements at face value. There has been little attempt to evaluate the CUD’s make up or the accuracy of its claims. The debate is almost always seen in terms of the CUD despite the fact that the CUD is only a part of the opposition to the EPRDF; and despite the apparent and frequent assumptions of CUD leaders to the contrary, both the UEDF and the OFDM are significant and independent elements of the political equation.

The first point about the CUD is that it is a coalition, and despite recent efforts to merge into a single party, a far from united coalition. Indeed, the very attempt to merge looks implausible from the outset when the title of the new organisation includes the word coalition, and in fact appears to have induced a new split within the organisation. This, perhaps, helps to explain the differing classifications of its leadership. These range from “well-known, highly educated, Western-oriented sophisticates…as liberal as any Ethiopian politician can plausibly be expected to be” (Professor Clapham) to the rather more plausible “right wing populist urban movement” (Professor Pausewang), not it might be noted, a party.  Highly educated and liberal may have some resonance in terms of Rainbow and EUDP-Medhin, but it has much less relevance for the CUD as a whole or more especially for the AEUP. The divergence underlines one of the most obvious points about the CUD – its disparity. It has some “highly educated, Western sophisticates”(a rather patronizing term, surely?), and some of its leaders certainly fall within such categories as “..heavily intellectual and urban-based…[with] academics...well to the fore, but also businessmen, medical doctors and other professionals.” (Clapham). Others do not.  

The CUD is, of course, composed of four separate parties that came together last year for the election. The four components of the CUD, usually referred to as Kinijit, are: the All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP), chairman Hailu Shawel; Rainbow Ethiopia – Movement for Democracy and Social Justice (Kestedamena), headed by Dr. Berhanu Nega, Mayor elect for Addis Ababa, and Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam; the small Ethiopian Democratic League, chairman Chekol Getahnun; and the Ethiopian United Democratic Party-Medhin (EUDP-Medhin), itself the product of four earlier mergers. EUDP-Medhin is headed by Dr. Admassu Gebeyheu, though he has been ill for much of the year and its most prominent personality is Lidetu Ayelew, previously second vice-chairman of CUD. 

Of these the two main parties are AEUP (Hailu Shawel) and EUDP-Medhin (Admassu Gebeyheu). They represent separate, essentially personalized, lines of descent from a single source - the All Amhara Peoples organisation set up by Professor Asrat in 1992. The rump of the AAPO itself provides another third strand of Amhara politics. AAPO supporters claim that AAPO was largely founded as a party to defend the Amhara that were specifically being targeted by the EPRDF at the time. It then received substantial support from the group of over 40 Addis Ababa University lecturers, nearly all Amhara, who did not have their contracts renewed or who were sacked following opposition to the referendum on Eritrea in April 1993.

The CUD itself was set up last year as part of opposition efforts to put together a broad anti-government coalition to oppose the EPRDF in the May elections. It followed efforts the year before in Washington to bring the Amhara parties into a grand anti-government coalition, the UEDF. AEUP and EDUP originally joined only to walk out a few months later. There was some divergence over policy but all accounts suggest the issue of the chairmanship was the most critical factor. In essence, Hailu Shawel and other Amharas were not prepared to accept the continued leadership of Dr. Beyene Petros and Dr. Merara Gudina. After this effort foundered, Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam played the major role in organising the CUD, using the Rainbow party he founded together with Dr. Berhanu Nega as a basis, in order to provide a largely Amhara alternative to the non-Amhara UEDF parties.  

From the beginning there were problems between the two larger parties in the CUD, the AEUP, and the EDUP-Medhin, though in fact friction between Hailu Shawel and Lidetu Ayalew long predates the formation of the CUD. Both were originally members of the AAPO. Hailu became vice- president but split the party when he was not elected president following Professor Asrat’s death, taking a majority of members with him. He was chosen as chairman of this fraction in 2000, and changed the name to AEUP in 2002. Its leadership certainly does include some whose views can only be described as hard-line Amhara chauvinism, as well as members of the former administration and Derg supporters, many if not most in the Diaspora. They have provided significant financing for the AEUP, and for CUD as whole from the US.

Lidetu, who was one time head of AAPO’s Youth Wing, also left AAPO, and subsequently played a major role in the creation of the Ethiopian Democratic Party that finally emerged last year, after several mergers of its own, as the EDUP-Medhin. The acquisition of one faction of a much-divided -Medhin has had the effect of widening EDP support base significantly beyond its former Amhara core with the addition of a significant number of non-Amhara intellectuals.

The ideological difference between the two AAPO off-shoots (AEUP and EDUP-Medhin) has never been significant, both holding an essentially similar critique of the TPLF's approach to ethnic federalism. They reflect the variant of Ethiopian nationalism that Professor Clapham regards as strongest among Amharas but also reflects a wider constituency in the country at large. Ethiopian nationalism, however, is not something confined to the CUD despite CUD propaganda; it is shared by numerous other parties and ethnic groups including for any impartial observer the EPRDF and even Tigreans!

In fact, while the AEUP and EUDP-Medhin have remained in competition for Amhara support, personality differences have underlined the difficulties of working together. If nothing else, the age difference has affected relations between Hailu Shawel (over 70) and Lidetu Ayelew (36). They have never worked well together. The split finally came at the end of October, shortly before the arrest of most CUD leaders. Lidetu was not one of them. He and his main ally, Mushe Semu, also a CUD executive committee member, had been suspended from the CUD on October 28, largely because they had resisted Hailu Shawel's insistent attempts to push the merger of the four parties through without sufficient consultation. A day later, some of EUDP-Medhin’s central committee was calling Hailu Shawel’s leadership of CUD "dictatorial, conspiratorial, factionist and obstinate".

In fact, open disagreements within CUD started almost immediately after the disputed May elections. Lidetu, at the time official party spokesman, opposed CUD participation in the proposed election complaints procedure, arguing that it would be useless and merely involve the CUD in what were essentially fake procedures. He resigned as party spokesman when the CUD did decide to take part, amid allegations by both sides within the party that the other had leaked information to the public. Other major disputes arose over whether the CUD should participate in parliament, over the proposed merger to turn the CUD into the CUDP, and over Hailu Shawel's (largely successful) attempts to turn the CUD into his personal fiefdom.  

There are also various regional factors that might be built into any analysis of the CUD, not least the Wollo/Lasta element in the EUDP-Medhin leadership. Lidetu Ayelew comes from the same village in northern Wollo as Dr. Admassu’s wife, Dr. Mulualem Takegne, also a member of the EUDP-Medhin central committee. There is no space here to look at this further except to note that there have been some suggestions that this element in EUDP-Medhin is attempting to provide a replacement for the regional role played, in recent years, by Wag/Lasta elements in the ANDM; and to note that a significant element in Hailu Shawel’s support comes from Gojjam and northern Shoa.

The EUDP-Medhin itself is also a coalition of interests. Originally, representing the more intellectual element in the AAPO, it concentrated on trying to build up a base in Addis Ababa, and with considerable success, winning some seats in the 2000 election and mobilizing considerable support from that base for this election. Indeed, it did far better in Addis Ababa than any other section of the CUD. This was partly because it had acquired the charismatic figure of Lidetu Ayelew who gained his reputation in the student demonstrations that preceded the riots in Addis Ababa in April 2001.

In fact, EDUP-Medhin’s successes in the election for the Addis Ababa City Council led to some distinctly sharp exchanges within the CUD central council when it became clear how the votes had divided up, both for Addis Ababa parliamentary members and for the city council. Neither Berhanu Nega, chairman of Rainbow, nor Dr. Admassu Gebeyheu, chairman of EUDP-Medhin, stood for parliament; both confined their aspirations to the Addis Ababa council. The EUDP-Medhin won fourteen of the parliamentary seats for Addis Ababa, compared to four for Rainbow, four for the AEUP and one for the small EDL. EUDP-Medhin also took nearly half of the city council seats, 64 out of 135. It was much better placed than the AEUP, largely Amhara supported, and Rainbow with substantial Gurage backing, to attract the very extensive protest vote against the EPRDF from all nationalities that manifested itself in the election in Addis Ababa. Without EUDP-Medhin, CUD support in Addis Ababa would have been no more than marginal; it would not have won control of the city council.   

One effect of the vote for EUDP-Medhin in Addis Ababa was a dispute over who should be mayor. There had been a strong pre-election presumption that Dr. Berhanu Nega was the most obvious candidate. After the election, there were a number of heated discussions over several weeks before agreement was reached for Berhanu to become the mayor and Admassu to take the position of his deputy. Indeed, if Dr. Admassu had not been ill, as he still is, many believe he could have successfully insisted on taking the position of mayor. It certainly required a lot of discussion before he and EUDP-Medhin gave way on the issue. 

When it came to the issue of participation in parliament, however, both Admassu and Berhanu lost out to Hailu Shawel. Berhanu, like a majority of the Addis Ababa CUD MPs-elect wanted CUD to take up its seats. Berhanu’s line was: we have won Addis Ababa and we should get on with the job. However, the government's insistence that this would only be possible if the CUD joined parliament made this impossible. Berhanu originally supported the concept that elected MPs and City Councilors would be betraying their constituents if they failed to take their seats. The counter-argument from Hailu Shawel and other AEUP leaders was that it would be a betrayal of constituents to take up seats in a parliament elected by fraud. To a majority of the EUDP-Medhin's "western-educated sophisticates" this was nonsense, but they were out-maneuvered by Hailu and his hard-line minority support in the CUD.

In fact, there were two points when the CUD came very close to accepting the idea of participation in parliament. On both occasions, it was the AEUP, and Hailu Shawel in particular, which played the major role in preventing it. The CUD was essentially divided on the issue and there was a lot of serious debate. Hailu led the rejectionist wing. Some of the more liberal (largely EUDP-Medhin) elements in the CUD though it would strengthen their hands to call public meetings to get support for attending parliament. The assumption was that there would be popular support for this as the public had voted for them. The first few meetings were held in Bole and similar areas. There was an overwhelming support for going into parliament. Hailu was appalled, and rapidly organised a counter move, shifting the meetings into kebeles in the mercato area and bringing in organised gangs of unemployed youngsters to ensure the results were against attendance. Within a few weeks, the liberal wing was deploring its own stupidity in trying to be too democratic. 

It was during this period that Hailu Shawel, who had gone to the US for medical treatment and to fund-raise from a Diaspora that was becoming impatient with the CUD failure to deliver on its promise of non-participation in parliament, announced that CUD would not enter parliament. Despite his statement to Ethiopian Review that the CUD central council unanimously supported this, the council immediately announced in Addis Ababa that Hailu had been speaking personally and the decision had yet to be made. Hailu rapidly returned to Addis Ababa. Decisions in the CUD council had previously been taken on a simple majority, but when it became clear that the supporters for participation would win the day, Hailu Shawel, surprisingly with support from Berhanu Nega, forced though a motion that serious issues had to have a 2/3^rd majority. Berhanu apparently believed that this was necessary to keep the CUD united. There is no doubt that Berhanu Nega had originally supported the view that the CUD should enter parliament. Outmaneuvered by rejectionists, reluctantly, and certainly under some duress, if former colleagues are to be believed, he finally accepted the side of confrontation and rejection in the interests of CUD unity. Another reason for this shift may have been the dispute that opened up between EDUP-Medhin and Rainbow over the position of mayor. In the end supporters of participation could have mustered 51% but they couldn’t manage 66% - though according to some reports they managed to reach 65% on one vote.

In the end Hailu Shawel won the day, and the CUD stayed out, with Hailu encouraging an alternative approach, that of non-violent demonstrations, knowing full well, as did a number of his central council, that this would lead to violence. The government made it quite clear after the killings in June that there would be a similar response to any attempt to carry the struggle out on to the streets. Rioting, of course, may raise awareness of a situation; it does not solve it. The November riots in Addis Ababa were the act of a class without power, organised by politicians who, as usual, did not and would not participate. And as always the people who took to the streets did not benefit, nor did the organizers intend them to do so. Riots are always extremely risky and the borderline between political violence and criminal activity is very thin. Violence of this kind rapidly descends into being an end in itself. It is a cliche that the unemployed and excluded living in almost total poverty with little or no hope of improvement, may enjoy the destruction, the burning of buses, the stoning of cars, even the deaths of policemen. The government claims to have real evidence that some CUD leaders organized the riots, though it has yet to produce it; it seems improbable that it has anything specific against others including a number of editors and journalists. But whether the government does have such evidence or not, there can be no doubt that the CUD knew exactly what the results would be. It is not surprising that the US categorized the November riots as a cynical and deliberate attempt to cause violence. The CUD's irresponsibility does not of course exonerate the government for its failure to deploy non-fatal methods of urban control or for the deaths of dozens of civilians, any more than the CUD can disclaim responsibility for the deaths of seven policemen and other civilians. 

At the end of the day a considerable element within the CUD has remained confused by the party's refusal to participate in parliament. Many believe that the members they voted for should join the parliament, take up their seats and run the Addis Ababa council. The MPs-elect themselves were divided to the point that the CUD was on the verge of a major split before the November riots. Nearly a third of the CUD MPs-elect had repudiated the party's boycott; in total of over 30 had taken up their seats. According to current rumors the number has now risen to 40, despite threats of violence made against them. The CUD leadership was concerned enough about the trend to set up a special committee in October, chaired by Hailu Shawel, to raise funds to provide salaries for those MPs and City Councilors who did not take up their seats. One result of all this has been that a considerable number of party members have been reluctant to accept some of the subsequent CUD calls for further action, including for example the travel ban, even the boycott of various products. Some of the calls from the Diaspora, for “woyane” or EPRDF supporters, to be refused entry into churches, or for government supporters to be purged from edir and ekub associations as well as professional bodies and community organisations, have led to widespread revulsion and disgust. Indeed, these put a rather different gloss on CUD denials of support for anti-Tigrean policies or anti-Tigrean remarks. 

The CUD does make an appeal to an Ethiopian nationalism that transcends the creation of ethnic federalism, a view reappeared to a substantial degree during the war with Eritrea.  However, if the outpourings of its supporters are any guide, it appeals rather more to a crude anti-Tigrean/anti-Eritrean nationalism with substantial Amhara chauvanist overtones. The writing of many pro-CUD intellectuals, notably Getachew Haile, and indeed, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, are laced with extensive anti-Tigrean propaganda, much of it highly offensive. The responses, one has to say, have been equally unpleasant. There is certainly no real sign of any CUD attempt to appeal to those nationalities that have a history of alienation from, or problems with, the historic Ethiopian state, Afars, Oromos, Somalis and others, even though these are certainly not satisfied by what the EPRDF has offered, or by the EPRDF’s failure to deliver on its promises. This is why the protest votes in Oromia and the Southern Nations, and in Addis Ababa of course, was so substantial, but it did not go to the CUD alone. 

In the elections for State Councils, in addition to sweeping Addis Ababa with the CUD taking all but one seat, the CUD did take a significant vote in the Amhara region (39%), a figure that it claims should have been higher in reality. This is true, but the figures from other regions make it clear that the impact of the CUD elsewhere was certainly limited largely to urban areas – 11% in the SNNP and in Beni-Shangul Gumuz; 9% in Harari and 6% in Oromia. The size of the CUD vote in some of these areas was unexpectedly high, but there is no indication, and certainly no evidence, that the CUD could have done any better outside the Amhara region and Addis Ababa in a fairer election. All indications are, however, that the UEDF and the ONC would have done so.

Many Oromos who were totally opposed to the EPRDF, turned out to vote for the OPDO for fear of a CUD victory. The CUD's appointment of Birtukan Mideksa, an Oromo, as its first vice-chairperson, was seen a little more than tokenism. There are no shared political values between the CUD and any Oromo parties, and the CUD's proposed changes to the federal structure offer nothing to the Oromo at all. As a result, one of the main reasons why a very significant element in the OLF wants to take up Meles’ offer of talks is to build a political coalition against the CUD. It is clear a significant element among Oromos in general, and in the OLF, would do so.

Southerners and Oromos have taken real fright against the possibility of a CUD victory. The perception is that the CUD intention to revoke Article 39 and to redraw the federal regional boundaries to return to something similar to the old imperial provinces, is no more than a device to restore Amhara supremacy. A division of Oromia into three or four provinces, even if these were all largely Oromo, would be opposed by almost all Oromos. Even to suggest such an idea indicates a total lack of understanding of Oromo politics. This is not in the CUD program, and the allegation may well be exaggerated. It is certainly not Rainbow or EUDP-Medhin policy, but it does appear to be the intention of some AEUP central committee members. There is a similar perception over the CUD’s undoubted intention to privatize land, a policy that is strongly supported by many international observers. Again, however, it is widely seen as a device to restore the large Amhara landholdings of imperial days.

These perceptions largely explain why the CUD/UEDF electoral coalition broke up so quickly. With such extensive differences of ideology and policy, it could never have lasted for any length of time, and the UEDF and the ONC could never have stayed in any coalition with the CUD unless there were major changes in CUD policy over Article 39 (self-determination) and Article 40 (land ownership), both of which the UEDF wishes to see unchanged. Ostensibly the main reason for the break-up was that the UEDF leaders in Addis Ababa, Dr. Beyene and Dr. Merara, decided to enter parliament. This was a decision that led several of the CUD leaders to go round referring publicly to Dr. Beyene as “Judas”. Indeed, CUD leaders, mainly from the AEUP, have never shown much restraint in disparaging Dr. Beyene in particular and Dr. Merara. Equally important, was the fact that neither Dr. Beyene nor Dr. Merara was prepared to accept Hailu Shawel's attempt to impose his authority over all the opposition.

As a result of their stance, Dr. Beyene and Dr. Marara have come a lot of criticism from CUD supporters. A press release on October 24 from a group claiming to represent the UEDF central committee in the US announced they had been expelled from their positions for entering parliament after the UEDF executive committee had voted 10 to 3 not to enter parliament on October 3rd. Although the press release was unsigned and so ignored it is likely to have a significant impact on the UEDF and ONC's Diaspora funding. CUD supporters in the Diaspora have made it clear that they regard joining parliament as the act of a traitor. Dr. Beyene and Dr. Merara have been the target of these and numerous other personal attacks. In another display of EPRDF insensitivity, or perhaps continued over-confidence, this had made little. The EPRDF and the government seem determined to be unhelpful even to those who have accepted, albeit reluctantly, the electoral results and been prepared to take their places in parliament. Indeed, if the government continues present parliamentary policies, the UEDF may well be forced out of parliament and back into an alliance with the CUD.

The treatment of Dr. Merara Gudina and the ONC is a case in point. In early September the ONC offices were vandalized and taken over by dissident members of the party, with the police refusing to respond to requests for help. Subsequently, the NEB apparently accepted that the dissidents led by Tolosa Tesfaye were the legal leadership of the party, and recognized the extraordinary general assembly held on September 22 and the central and executive committees appointed there. And on November 17, the NEB said that it regarded Tolosa as the leader of the ONC. Dr. Merara claims that the assembly of September 22 was held illegally. Virtually all of the ONC's 39 MPs support Dr. Merara.   

The other major problem within the CUD arose over the issue of the attempt to merge the four component parts of CUD into one single organisation. The idea, which was Hailu Shawel's, was proposed by the AEUP and agreed in August though with some reservations by the other parties. During the next few weeks, AEUP demanded the process should be speeded up. The other three parties disagreed, and EUDP-Medhin suggested the process needed to be discussed at every level not just by executive and central committees. AEUP complicated the argument by announcing unilaterally that it would take 45% of the membership in the executive and central committees of the merged party. The earlier agreement had been than AEDP and EDUP should have equal, larger shares, while Rainbow and EDL as smaller parties should have smaller representation in the merged party. This had seemed agreeable, and the AEUP sudden claims for the largest share did not appeal to any of the others. AEDP claimed it had a much larger membership, more officers, greater financial capacity with support from the Diaspora, and greater political experience. Given the experience of the election it is clear that any numerical claims should be treated with extreme caution. EDUP-Medhin certainly disputed the argument, pointing out that it had been much more successful in Addis Ababa and it therefore must have far greater support there than AEDP or any other party. One major critic of the idea of a rushed merger was Lidetu Ayelew, the CUD 2^nd vice-chairman; one of the reasons why he had left the AEUP/AAPO some years earlier has been concern over just this issue of Hailu Shawel's determination to exercise complete control. EUDP-Medhin concerns were reinforced by suggestions from Hailu Shawel supporters that their leader should be given emergency powers by the CUD council, including a veto power over all CUD executive committee decisions, allowing the chairman to make all decision himself should the council be unable to meet.

Professor Mesfin attempted to mediate the dispute from his sick-bed. He was annoyed enough with both sides to make public reference to people with an "undisciplined ambition for power", without specifying to whom he was referring to. Many people though he meant both Hailu and Lidetu. The debate rapidly spread into the public domain, with both sides producing pamphlets and papers using official party stamps to support allegations of egoism against supporters of Hailu Shawel or fifth columnists (sego gebotch) against those who backed Lidetu. Other allegations referred to “highly secretive and machiavellian” groups, “extremist agendas”, and the orchestration of "undemocratic and dangerous moves”. 

Following an EUDP-Medhin general assembly in September, the EUDP-Medhin's executive committee was mandated to take the process of the merger slowly. By 10 votes to 7, the committee originally supported Lidetu's arguments that the party should be careful not to be pushed into something by Hailu. Hailu was furious at the implied criticism of his policies and by the check to his own plans. At a meeting of the CUD executive committee the next day, he demanded immediate agreement on the merger, and no more discussion. He said the CUD would push ahead with the merger within two days, even without EDUP-Medhin. This confirmed the view of many EUDP-Medhin members that the AEUP was intending to merge at their expense, a point stressed by Lidetu. However, a browbeaten EUDP-Medhin executive committee eventually fell into line, apparently in the interests of overall CUD unity, and reversed its position, agreeing to an immediate merger by 12 votes to 5. A day later the CUD’s executive committee, with Hailu Shawel in full control, announced that Lidetu and Mushe were suspended. In support of this, a petition for Lidetu’s removal was suddenly produced. It allegedly came from his constituency and supposedly contained 75,000 signatures. One does not have to be a supporter of the EPRDF, or of Lidetu, to find this highly improbable.

For the few weeks preceding this, Lidetu had been subject to a highly unpleasant smear campaign in a number of pro-CUD papers, with claims that he'd been holding talks with senior government officials, taking money from Sheikh Mohamed Al-Amoudi, the owner of the Sheraton Hotel, and that he had sold out to the government. There was no evidence for any of this, although the fact that he and his supporters were not arrested with the other CUD leaders in early November added fuel to the rumors. The allegations have continued with a recent claim in Ethiopian Review  (November 24): "it is now clear that Ato Lidetu has joined the EPRDF's war of destruction on CUD".

There is in fact a clear pattern of demonizing anyone who disagrees with the CUD leadership or with any if its policies, and rather more evidence for this than the reverse. Professor Mesfin in a recent letter attacking the donor ambassadors for urging the CUD to attend parliament, rather pointedly looking back to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s and its atrocities and asking who the grandfather of the Italian ambassador might have been.   

The arrest of Hailu Shawel and other CUD leaders on November 1 and 2 has, of course, changed the situation, and certainly affected EUDP-Medhin policies. At the moment, EUDP-Medhin and Lidetu are no closer to the government than before. Both he and the party remain as critical as ever of government policies, of the arrests and of the government's heavy-handedness in dealing with the riots. Nevertheless, there must be a strong possibility that Lidetu will soon leave the CUD formally and take a majority of the EUDP-Medhin with him. He has himself has made it clear in the past he would prefer to join parliament if circumstances permit, though this remains politically impossible while the government threatens treason trials for the CUD leaders. Lidetu currently insists he will not join parliament. It is noticeable however that there are very few EUD-Medhin leaders among those detained. Equally, EUDP-Medhin is it is now in a position to make a bid to take over leadership of the Amhara opposition from Hailu Shawel and the AEDP. It is likely to take the opportunity, irrespective of whether Hailu and other CUD leaders are put on trial. Lidetu has now called for a general assembly of the party to clarify its stance, to take place within a week or two, though this may depend upon being able to get party documents back from the police who ransacked EUDP-Medhin offices at the time of the riots.

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